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Abstract. This paper surveys existing enterprise technologies that con-
trol access to confidential digital data, and analyzes the impact of sys-
tem and staff unavailability on the obtained security. The researched
technologies allow restrictions to be placed on copying, editing, viewing
and printing from within various software applications, provide audit-
ing options and prevent outsider access through encryption. We discuss
USB access control solutions, digital rights management software, disk
encryption techniques and operating system solutions, respectively. An
interesting aspect of the various technologies is their reliance on the co-
operation of various people and system components, thus making it vul-
nerable to unavailability of these people and components. Two opposite
effects (security risk and productivity loss) determine the effectiveness
of information security technologies, and we analyze the impact of un-
availability of resources on both these metrics.
1 Introduction
Recently published data suggests that some of the most serious IT threats orga-
nizations face relate to the theft and careless distribution of data by employees.
[9] suggests that the greatest information security threats within an organization
are leakage of confidential information and distortion of sensitive information.
These threats have the potential to damage company reputations and impact
upon the potential customer base [9], as well as inviting sanctions by indus-
trial regulatory bodies [9]. One of the contributing factors is the ease with which
data can be copied and carried. By 2006 at least two-thirds of office workers [2,4]
owned a removable storage device (e.g. USB memory stick, media player etc.),
and some 70% of workers connected a removable storage device to a company
PC on a daily basis [2]. Portable storage devices are one of the major conduits of
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data leakage within Europe [9]. Following from this, 70% of all security breaches
originate from inside company networks [2], with 60% of incidents caused by hu-
man error [2]. Furthermore, it is estimated that two-thirds of USB sticks are lost
by their owners, with 20% of these devices containing sensitive information [2].
Over 50% of IT professionals feel that EU legislation should require businesses
to protect any personal data they retain from threats internal to the company.
Proposed solutions include the deployment of consistent internal security policies
and tools to realize such policies.
Although the above numbers should be considered with care (the publishing
source may be biased, and/or the data is reported in a way that does not lend
itself to scientific validation), the above suggests a growing security problem.
Recent news items, such as the loss of CDs with personal data of millions of UK
citizens further illustrate the risks [27]. The following example of an employee
using a removable USB storage device illustrates key points relating to enterprise
information security. It is feasible to imagine the use, by operations staff, of
USB memory sticks to store company/confidential data whilst outside of the
company’s environment. A typical problem might be that a staff member buys a
memory stick from a high-street store, saves confidential or sensitive data onto
it on Friday afternoon, and reloads the data to the system on Monday morning.
Over the weekend, the stick may have been exposed to a range of highly insecure,
potentially corrupted environments.
This previous use case alludes to requirements both within and outside the
associated working environment. Access control measures must be taken to limit
the risks to enterprises and the public, but the danger exists that such measures
may negatively influence the productivity of employees. If an access control so-
lution proves to be less than transparent, it may influence the behavior patterns
of those users that it directly affects. For example, access to a secured device
may be restricted to environments operating the same company-controlled access
control software, which may make ‘working from home’ infeasible. In this paper
we analyze this trade-off between security improvement and productivity loss, in
particular with respect to the reliability of the chosen access control measures.
In this paper we first survey current information security technologies. These
technologies are all available as industrial products, using well-established soft-
ware security and management solutions. By putting these technologies into
perspective we can analyze their respective strengths and weaknesses. We note
that this survey is a synopsis of a more detailed Newcastle University technical
report [19]. We focus here on the main technologies that we believe will remain
valid for considerable time to come, leaving out most of the product comparisons
and pricing schemes one can find in [19].
From our survey, it will become clear that the discussed information secu-
rity technologies can be quite involved, requiring systems such as directories and
client applets to be deployed, protected devices to be networked, and adminis-
trative staff to be present to deal with policy exceptions. From the perspective
of the IT administrators, information security is offered as a service to the users
within an enterprise, with requirements for the reliability and availability of var-
ious components as well as the help desk. From the user perspective, the service
may potentially be regarded as a hindrance, and almost per definition introduces
overhead in many routine work-related activities. Thus, a trade-off between se-
curity improvement and productivity loss must be considered when introducing
such technologies into the enterprise. In this paper we study the influence of com-
ponent and people unavailability on this trade-off decision. We believe that the
proposed analysis may present a useful tool when making investment decisions
about reliability improvements and help desk staffing.
This paper is organized as follows. We survey technologies in four categories:
USB access control solutions in Section 2, digital rights management solutions
(Section 3), disk encryption solutions (Section 4) and operating system solutions
(Section 5). Section 6 summarizes the capabilities of the technologies visited in
the preceding sections, while discussing outstanding and introduced vulnerabil-
ities. Section 7 then provides the unavailability impact analysis on the effective-
ness of information security solutions.
2 USB Access Control Solutions
USB access control software is primarily concerned with how removable data-
storage devices interact with the computer network operated by an organiza-
tion, and how the associated physical connection endpoints can be secured and
brought under control of the organization. Using these technologies users of an
enterprise network and the company data therein should adhere to a unified
device access policy dictated from within the organization, thereby providing
predictable, manageable behavior amongst the associated workforce.
The principal driving factor of the considered technologies is prevention of
data theft from within an organization [5,22,25]. This is closely coupled with
preventing the injection of unsolicited content into the network (as promoted by
[8]). Compliance with regulatory standards and copyright laws is also highlighted
[20,22,24]. [10] also promotes endpoint access control as a means of limiting the
maintenance overhead introduced by unauthorized devices. Coverage is provided
to control access to other USB device endpoints (such as Firewire and writeable
CD drives), and remote-communication channels such as WiFi and Bluetooth.
The considered technologies install from a centralized security station, send-
ing client-side installations directly to user workstations. Most products suggest
that they actively attempt to deploy as little logic as possible upon user work-
stations [3,8,10]. Deployment in this way assumes that all computers connected
to an organization network are centrally managed. There is also an assumption
that corporations have dedicated IT security staff available at all times. Control
of access permissions by IT personnel is centralized (typically through a dedi-
cated software-based management console). If this central management system
were to fail, company-wide data security policies may become inconsistent or
inoperable.
The timely deployment of per-user or per-device access controls relies upon
the availability of specialized staff. However, one can automate access policies
Fig. 1. Centralized administration of end-user workstations
applicable to groups of users and known device types. Common (i.e. predictable)
working practices, with static user access permissions, can be controlled in this
way without intervention from administrative staff. Policy exceptions (e.g. a need
to correct improper policy clauses or to add a new device type upon request)
would however require action by the appropriate IT personnel.
Many products employ ‘white-list’ and ‘black-list’ approaches to device access
(Fig. 2), which can respectively be used to explicitly include or exclude devices
within an organization’s device access schemes. This allows access policies to be
reused across different user accounts or user groups. Administrative personnel
are however required to maintain these lists.
A number of USB access control solutions [5,10,11,20,22,24] incorporate file-
type filtering techniques to limit the types of files that can be transferred to
removable media. Filtering schemes are defined by administrators and enacted at
user workstations local to the access endpoints. These technologies can prohibit
executable files or ‘autorun’ programs from being copied to or executed from
removable storage devices. Such precautions are prudent in the face of threats
to the company network from malicious software, but if managed inappropriately
may not accommodate legitimate use of a program from a device (e.g. an in-house
prototype application).
The USB access restriction technologies deal with the possibility that employ-
ees will try to exploit the enterprise network from within, regardless of whether
Fig. 2. ‘White list’ and ‘black list’ device access control
they hold the appropriate access permissions. End users may also unintention-
ally access files that they should not have been able to. If recorded, these events
can be analyzed and prevented from reoccurring. As such, audit trails of device
and file access are generated, such as which devices were connected to which
ports, and which files were accessed by which users. Duplications of copied data
are also retained, should they be needed as evidence against employees during
any subsequent legal action against them.
Facilities to encrypt data before it is transferred to removable storage devices
(either automatically or after prompting end users) are also being used, and
often even facilitate access to encrypted data outside of the work environment
[3,5,20,24]. Use of encryption essentially extends the reach of the enterprise,
securing data in such a way that it can only be accessed in accordance with an
organization’s data access policies.
Most technologies provide for employees needing to gain legitimate, tempo-
rary access to a device otherwise prohibited by their assigned access rights, or
gain access to a protected device from a machine that is outside of the control of
the organization. With the latter it is assumed that the central policy server can
be contacted from the subject machine through a network connection. Prod-
ucts offer distinct methods for achieving offline access to secured devices. For
instance [3] and [25] permit temporary access to secured devices through phone
conversations with IT administrators (to obtain an access code). This relies
on the availability of administrative staff, and is not directly integrated with
enterprise-wide access management; it is not clear whether the details of phone
conversations are synchronized with device access logs. Others [22] provide of-
fline device access through a specialized utility carried with data when a device
is encrypted, essentially re-appropriating the device as a self-enclosed, encrypted
store.
All of the USB access control products reviewed support only the Microsoft
Windows family of operating systems (generally the 2000/XP range, and the
NT4/2003 Server derivations). There is limited support for the Microsoft Win-
dows Vista platform (as provided by [22,24], for example), and Novell eDirec-
tory (exhibited by [5,20,24]). There is no support for the Macintosh OS or Linux
platforms. Efforts have been made to seamlessly integrate products with the
Windows platform through the extension of existing functionality. Products in-
tegrate directly with Windows Active Directory [13], binding the latter’s access
management directory services with file and device access permissions.
3 Digital Rights Management (DRM) Solutions
The technologies described in this section are concerned with enforcing data
management and intellectual property policies, so as to maintain lawful business
practices and structured data control. The focus is less on how devices that may
contain company files are managed, and more so on how company data contained
within individual files is secured in a manner which is both logical and can be
persisted for as long as the associated data exists. As such, these technologies may
be employed to describe and enforce levels of access to sensitive and protected
company file content that correspond to the access rights of members or groups of
staff. They are aimed at securing specific types of electronic documents, and are
intended for use by those subsets of employees working with ‘office’ documents
(e.g. word processor or spreadsheet files).
The technologies in this section aim to ensure that the content of confi-
dential files is only available to those persons that have the correct privileges.
Centralized access rights are associated with company files. Access schemes for
individual files persist with those files regardless of whether they reside within
the enterprise network, on a removable data storage device, or on a computer
that is not controlled by the organization. [18] extends the applicability of doc-
ument security by including capabilities to track the use of sensitive enterprise
data both within and outside the company network. [1] provides content in-
tegrity as a means to manage intellectual property, adding document signing
and watermarking capabilities.
As with the USB access control solutions, all of the products described in
this section are centrally managed. All of the permissions associated with a par-
ticular document are stored in a centralized location within the organization.
With an emphasis on data security, the technologies [18,28] audit end user ac-
cess to protected files. Audited information includes details of successful and
attempted file access events, including the identified user, the time of the event,
the application that was used, and the location of the accessed file.
Content control products are primarily concerned with restricting the editing,
copying, storage, and printing of protected file contents. All these technologies
provide role based access schemes, and incorporate encryption as a means of
securing the contents of confidential files. Some, such as [18], require users to
‘log in’ to protected files, either with a dedicated password or automatically with
their Windows user account information. Others, such as [1], provide extensive
authentication capabilities, including the ability to associate digital certificates
or watermarking attributes to encrypted files. Emphasis is placed on how secu-
rity policies remain associated with the subject file, with an expectation that
files will be transferred between secure and insecure locations. With [18] access
identities have configurable and enforceable offline periods, thereby accommo-
dating the mobility of employees. Sealed documents can be created and accessed
through use of dedicated creation and reader applications. [1] integrates authen-
tication measures directly into a protected document, with the expectation that
secured files may be transferred across different storage devices and across differ-
ent realms of authority. [1] can also create ‘secure teams’ of employees, allowing
collaboration with external companies regarding file content.
4 Disk Encryption Solutions
Disk encryption solutions protect the contents of hard drives from unauthorized
users while also ensuring that contents are not compromised and transported to
external storage devices.
There exist several variations of disk encryption technologies. [26] is a disk
encryption solution with the capability to encrypt an entire hard disk partition
or a storage device such as a USB flash drive. [7] is a hard disk encryption
application which automatically encrypts and decrypts data as it moves to and
from an encrypted drive. [23] concentrates on securing confidential data as it
travels between individuals. The argument here is that data is only at risk when
it is being transported, be that via removable media (such as USB storage devices
or CDs) or e-mails.
[7] and [23] provide role based access schemes, whereas with [26] users are
prompted for access passwords or key files whenever they mount a protected
drive. [23] encrypts files in a self-contained manner, so no additional software is
required to access the file at a later date. [7] incorporates features such as secure
data wiping, and management of the programs permitted to access secured data.
For example, employees may be granted access to a file, but without the ability
to simultaneously run file copying programs.
With [26] if there is a need to access a TrueCrypt volume simultaneously
from multiple operating systems, an encrypted volume can either be mounted
or dismounted on a single computer (e.g. a server), to allow decrypted or en-
crypted shared access to drive contents respectively, as appropriate. Options are
available in [23] to create self-extracting secured files, which are then associated
with an integrated password authentication application. [26] can run in so-called
‘traveler’ mode, so that it does not have to be directly installed on the platform
under which it is run. [7] provides USB disk portability, in that it can be used
with USB storage drives, DVDs, portable media players etc.
5 Operating System Solutions
It is worth investigating whether any of the access control or digital rights man-
agement functionality (as discussed in Sections 2 and 3) is available within cur-
rent operating systems. If it were it would be possible that the features required
by a company may be integrated into the operating system they already use,
negating the purchase and maintenance of additional applications.
Microsoft Windows Vista. The latest version of the Microsoft Windows
operating system, Windows Vista [14], provides additional functionality for the
control of both copyrighted material and stored data. It is the belief of Microsoft
that next generation multimedia content such as BluRay will see greater adop-
tion over the next few years [21]. Windows Vista incorporates what is called the
Protected Media Path (PMP) to ensure that protected (i.e. copyright-controlled)
content can be accessed correctly. Documentation states that high definition con-
tent is “valuable content that needs to be protected from stealing”, and that as
such “each content type has its own particular policy that defines what the user
can and cannot do with it”.
Windows Vista provides group policy settings to define end user access per-
missions for removable storage devices (e.g. USB and other removable media,
CD/DVD drives) [16]. An administrator can apply policies to control whether
users are able to read from or write to removable storage devices.
Microsoft Windows Vista enterprise and Ultimate editions include BitLocker
drive encryption [17]. With BitLocker the entire Windows volume is encrypted
to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to hard drive contents. The
Encrypting File System can also be used to encrypt files and folders to pro-
tect data from unauthorized access. Although not a part of the Windows Vista
operating system, the Microsoft Windows Office 2003 suite of applications pro-
vides features for information rights management [15]. Office 2003 documents
(specifically files created in Microsoft Word 2003, Microsoft Excel 2003 or Mi-
crosoft Powerpoint 2003) can have restrictions associated with them to control
the actions that particular users can enact on protected files.
Microsoft Windows XP also incorporates Encrypting File System. Windows
XP can also be augmented with the Windows Rights Management Service [12],
allowing centrally managed permissions to be associated with Microsoft Office
documents.
Other Operating Platforms: Similar functionality to that described in
Microsoft Windows Vista (i.e. centralized document access control, device ac-
cess control, off-line drive protection etc.) is not immediately available on the
Macintosh OS or Linux platforms.
Operating Adminis-
Platform tration Coverage Monitoring Encryption
Access Windows Central Devices, Audit Files,
Control Programs Trails Portable Drives
DRM Windows Central Files, Audit Files
File Content Trails
Disk Windows, Local Fixed Disks, None Drives
Encryption Linux Portable Disks
Operating Windows Central, Files, None Drives
System Local Devices,
Programs
Table 1. Summary of features offered for different information security solutions.
6 Discussion of Technologies
The main features of the various information security technologies we have re-
viewed can be found in Table 1. We now close our survey of technologies by
discussing particular complications that may arise from introducing any of the
discussed technologies into an enterprise network. These complications have the
potential to restrict employee productivity or otherwise leave existing vulnera-
bilities in conventional working practices unresolved.
Centralized Administration. All of the access control solutions that were exam-
ined follow a model of centralized control, wherein access policies are recorded at
a single location from which they are pushed to end users whenever they inter-
act with the network. This approach maintains consistent, manageable security
policies, but in itself can create problems. It is assumed that all workstations
with access to secured company data are accessible from any location within
the company network. Where employees are working with sensitive files, it is
assumed those files can be secured from a remote location without consultation
with the end user.
Local Agents. There is the potential for locally deployed security software agents
on end user workstations to fail. ‘Failure’ may be regarded as the product inter-
acting with the local software platform in an unpredictable manner, or otherwise
not providing a level of adaptability that the end user is comfortable with (for
instance if they regularly require atypical security permissions).
Centralized Policy Management. Although centralized policy management pro-
vides for a consistent data security environment, it limits the control that end
users have with regards to their own access rights. If an employee has a genuine
and legitimate requirement for a specific access permission not already asso-
ciated with their user account, they must rely on IT personnel to accurately
provide the relevant permissions in a timely manner. Even the most expedient
procedures could not achieve this without causing some delay to the end user.
In what follows, we will analyze the impact of these issues (particularly com-
ponent failure and staff unavailability) on the effectiveness of information secu-
rity solutions.
7 Unavailability Impact Analysis
7.1 Trade-Offs
The software solutions described in this document purport to solve a variety of
data protection problems in the workplace. These include prohibiting improper
use of USB (and other) endpoints, securing confidential document content, and
securing data at rest within the company network. If an organization is to con-
sider purchasing products to resolve the latter issues, there are associated factors
that must be assessed.
System and Support. The great majority of products require that user pro-
files and resources within a company network be centrally managed. In order to
ensure timely deployment and management of access permissions amongst em-
ployees, it is necessary to have appropriate numbers of IT staff to regulate user
access rights and permissions relating to new and differing storage media or file
content. To further ensure that a central management system is kept functional
and responsive, it may be necessary to incorporate some level of redundancy
into the company network. Without this, if parts of the network were to cease
functioning correctly, employee productivity may be limited or inconsistencies
in the network-wide access control scheme may be introduced.
Productivity Loss. Employee productivity may be hindered by deployment of a
chosen software solution. End users may find that their normal work routines
need to be altered, or that completely new ways of interacting with the network
need to be developed. Adapting to new network procedures may take time away
from other areas of work, or could potentially sway employees away from their
normal work routines entirely.
In what follows, we first quantify productivity loss, and look at how unavail-
ability of system and support influences the productivity loss metrics. Then we
discuss the trade-off between increased security and productivity loss. In both
cases, we use probabilistic/stochastic modelling to describe the interactions be-
tween technologies, users and staff, relying on the Mo¨bius software [6] to create
and solve the models.
Fig. 3. Stochastic Activity Network of USB access control (base scenario)
7.2 Productivity Loss
Fig. 3 shows a model representing access control technologies as discussed in
Section 2 and Section 3. For ease of explanation, Fig. 3 shows the simplest
model we used; more complicated versions of the depicted stochastic activity
network (a formalism used in [6]) were necessary to derive the results in the
next subsection. The flow of the users can easily be understood from Fig. 3 when
following the arcs. There exist a number of active users (‘Active Users’), which
exercise the local PC protection software (‘LocalSW’) at a certain frequency
(given by ‘Security Check’). It takes some time to do the local software check
(given by the time taken by ‘Searching Success1’), and after completion two
things can happen. When the check was resolved correctly, the user returns to
the active mode, while if the check was not resolved correctly, the global directory
(‘Global Directory’) is called. Some time is taken to perform the check at the
global directory (activity ‘Searching Success2’), after which again two things
may happen. When the check is resolved correctly at the global directory, the
user returns to the active user mode, while if the check is not resolved correctly,
the administrative staff has to be contacted (‘Admin Staff’). There again the
user spends some time, but we assume in the base model that success is then
guaranteed, and the user can return to active user mode (in the next section we
relax that assumption). The model also accounts for failures and repairs of the
global directory (activities ‘fail’ and ‘repair’ between the places ‘Directory up’
and ‘Directory down’) and the presence and absence of staff (activities ‘leave’
and ‘back’ between the places ‘Staff Present’ and ‘Staff leave’).
The time scale of the model is in minutes. We assume that each user interacts
with the access control technologies once every 10 minutes on average and the
software spends about 5 seconds doing the local check. In one percent of the cases,
we assume the global directory is called; this number may vary a lot depending
on the specific product, see Section 2. At the global directory about one minute is
spent on average to determine execution rights. Again, one percent of requests is
not resolved at the global directory, at which time administrative staff is called.
The staff is assumed to spend 30 minutes on an average call. Note that the
above implies that only one in ten thousand interactions with the access control
solution end up at administrative staff, and that each individual user calls staff
only once per year on average (to be precise, once every one hundred thousand
active minutes). In the base scenario, the global database goes down once per
three working days for an average of ten minutes, while staff takes a break once
every four hours for thirty minutes. (Of course, all parameter choices need to be
adjusted for the case at hand when applying the model in practice.)
In our model we increase the number of users up to tens of thousands, using
a discrete approximation to keep the state space limited. That is, we assume
100 active users circle around in the model, each representing a group of users
as determined by a model multiplier. By incorporating the multiplier correctly
in the various transition rates, we can approximate the behavior of a system
with tens of thousands of users by a model that has less than one million states.
Arguably, one million states is still a considerable amount, but easily manageable
with tools such as [6].
To measure the productivity loss, we compute the fraction of time a user
spends in any place other than ‘Active Users’, since this can be considered time
‘wasted’ because of access control technologies. Fig. 4 shows the results, for up to
25,000 employees (users). One sees that once the number of employees rises above
two thousand, the system starts to deteriorate. For less than several hundreds of
employees, the productivity loss is limited to one percent of an employee’s time.
For a company with 1000 employees, the productivity loss is about two percent,
while for 3000 users the productivity loss rises above ten percent, and continues
increasing when the number of users increases further.
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on above mentioned rates re-
veal that the staff presence is the bottleneck once the number of employees
increases beyond one or two thousand. In our second experiment, we set the
number of users to one thousand, and look at the sensitivity of employee pro-
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ductivity to the availability of staff to help when called. Note that one thousand
employees amounts to less than one staff involvement per hour. Fig. 5 plots the
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Fig. 6. Number of Employees (x-axis) versus total Number of Failed Interactions with
the Access Control System per minute (y-axis)
productivity loss depending on the frequency with which staff leaves (and is ab-
sent for about 30 minutes); that is, the left-most data point in the graph depicts
a staff member departing every 15 minutes. We see in Fig. 5 that as soon as staff
members are interrupted every two hours or less, productivity starts to degrade
for this particular scenario. In a similar way, results for multiple staff members
can be derived, and decisions about the right number of staff members for an
enterprise can be derived.
7.3 Departing Users
In the second model we assume that users are not as patient as in the above base
model. In the above model, no matter how long the requests are queued in the
global directory, or how long the administrative staff is on leave, the user waits
for the access control solution to take a decision. In this subsection, we assume
that when resources are unavailable (i.e. down or occupied), users leave the access
control system; in such a case, the interesting question is what could or should
happen with the task the employee wanted to carry out. At the one extreme,
such failed interactions with the access control solution result in the employee
not being able to do their task, thus seriously impairing the productivity of an
employee. At the other extreme, the user is allowed to complete the task, thus
seriously impairing security. In between these two extremes, the employee may
be given the power to decide for him or herself; in some settings, this may be
an appropriate corporate strategy, best balancing the trade-off between security
improvement and productivity loss.
To quantify the trade-off between productivity loss because of terminating
requests, we consider each individual interaction with the access control system,
and determine if it completes or fails. We show in Fig. 6 the number of instances
per time unit in which the interaction with the access control solution fails, and
the employee either cannot complete its work, or must make a decision him or
herself. The question thus becomes, for an enterprise with 25 thousand employ-
ees, how important are these 6 uncompleted interactions every minute, and how
much damage can they potential do if we let the employee make the decision
what to do next. As a rule, the employee should not decide if for an average
interaction the expected cost cp because of productivity loss is less than the ex-
pected cost cs because of security impairment. So, if p is the probability that an
employee makes the right decision when forced to do so, then one should allow
the employee to make that decision if cp < (1−p).cs. It should be noted that the
access control system is introduced exactly because the probability p is in general
not believed to be high enough. In other words, assuming the introduction of the
access control system was a financially appropriate decision, allowing employees
to make individual decisions makes sense only if employees make more careful de-
cisions in the remaining cases in which the system delegates the decision-making
to the user. Note furthermore that the trade-off between security enhancements
and productivity loss can be decided yet better if attack modes and attack mode
probabilities are known, and if the risk cs can be identified for all these different
attack modes.
8 Conclusion
A variety of enterprise information technologies have emerged over recent years,
‘productized’ by many different vendors. It seems therefore appropriate at this
time to survey the available access control solutions, and evaluate their strengths
and weaknesses. This paper does so. Since the great majority of the technologies
examined in this document use centralized administration models to consistently
manage role and group based access to critical company data, these solutions
depend on the availability of computing and people resources. We built a proba-
bilistic model and illustrated how the model can be used to determine the impact
of system and staffing availability on the achieved security as well as the loss
of productivity. It can also be used to improve staffing decisions as well as IT
resource decisions.
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